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State Intervention and the Family: Problems of 
Policyt 
William J. Goode* 
From time immemorial, and perhaps before that, too, politi- 
cal philosophers have cherished the dream that they could im- 
prove mankind if only they could change the family system. 
Whenever thinkers have envisioned the ideal society, they have 
placed their ideal of family behavior as its center. In Plato7s 
Republic, the family as we know it would be abolished, for it 
interferes with the equal opportunity (for both men and women) 
he so much desired. Confucius, by contrast, thought that the 
relation of the citizen to the emperior should be that  of a dutiful 
child to his or her parent, but he also believed that  family pat- 
terns were the foundations of a harmonious civil order. Revolu- 
tions have often proclaimed a new family order because it is be- 
lieved that  only thereby can a radically new society be con- 
structed. 
In this most troublous of times, it is not surprising that so 
many now propose that we strengthen the family, this key ele- 
ment in the social structure, in order to restore, or at least to shore 
up, a failing social system; for clearly the system is failing. We 
observe that people no longer give much respect to authority, but 
we must also grant that people in power do not seem to have 
earned that  respect either, for they have permitted, or even 
caused, violations of law and civic rights, corruption in high and 
low places, and a general fall from civic virtue. Thus, it is a time 
of moral reevaluation. 
We must ask whether a great society, arrogant in its world 
power and astonishing in its affluence, can, unlike all great em- 
pires of the past, simply stop, look at  itself, decide that it has 
proceeded down the wrong turn, and thus alter its goals. Is it 
possible to make national decisions that would aim a t  improving 
the quality of our life, and not simply a t  enlarging the gross 
national product or accelerating our "progress" still more? Must 
we continue to expand our ability to wage war, to control other 
t This paper was prepared for delivery a t  the 1976 Conference on Government Impact 
in Family Life, conducted by the Family Research Center, Brigham Young University. A 
version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of the Conference. 
* Giddings Professor of Sociology, Columbia University. B.A., 1938, M.A., 1939, 
University of Texas; Ph.D., 1946, Pennsylvania State University; D.Sc., 1970, Upsala 
University. 
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countries, and to spy on our own private citizens? 
Although I believe that only a minority suppose the problems 
of our time were caused by the breakdown in the family, certainly 
many more do suppose that (1) such a breakdown has paralleled 
the unfortunate directions our nation has chosen in the recent 
past, and (2) an improvement in family life would have at  least 
some broad salutary social effects on the fabric of national life 
generally. The connections between the quality of family life and 
the rest of the social structure of the larger society have seemed 
clear enough to many observers in the past, and I think we should 
look very briefly a t  some of those connections. 
We note that in every decade since the Civil War, the divorce 
rate has risen. Last year, it rose to more than a million in sheer 
numbers, and with it, of course, the number of children involved 
in divorces. The number of households headed by the mother 
alone continues to increase. The illegitimacy ratio has risen over 
the past three decades among both blacks and whites. Parent- 
youth conflict, although certainly down somewhat from its peak 
in the late 1960's, remains high. The rate of juvenile crime contin- 
ues upward, a fact that most would link with the failure of par- 
ents to control their children a t  younger ages. Indeed, it is diffi- 
cult to point to any developments in family relationships that 
have contributed much to increased social stability, individual 
virtue, or, for that matter, even pleasure-that widely sought goal 
of this generation. 
Indeed, when we survey the supposed "progress" of our 
epoch, we must concede that the only kinds of activities that have 
become easier or have improved over the past century are tech- 
nological and mechanical ones, while almost every task or goal 
that has to do with community spirit, virtue, cooperation, neigh- 
borliness, social stability, harmony, or caring for others has be- 
come more difficult to accomplish than in the past. Such goals 
cannot be achieved if people have not been reared or trained in 
the family to value them and to work toward them effectively. 
We must, however, consider further the peculiar historical 
epoch we live in. Until the Industrial Revolution, few, if any, 
governments had made any serious attempts to change the family 
system. Before that, of course, religious prophets made such at- 
tempts from time to time. In most great civilizations of the past, 
family problems were dealt with by family leaders, as in China, 
India, and Japan, or by family leaders with the aid of religious 
leaders, as among the Arab and Jewish people. In all of these 
cases, the various moral authorities did not attempt to fashion a 
new and better family system, as so many of our moral gurus do 
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in our time, but simply called everyone to return to the tradi- 
tional ways. In any event, they were not the state.' .i 
In the pre-industrial West, there was some government inter- 
vention through the courts, focused on very particular problems 
of primary concern to the wealthy, such as the property of 
spouses, dowers and dowries, or the inheritance of land. Thus, 
both family law and changes in it were of importance primarily 
to the upper classes. Here, too, the aim was not to improve family 
behavior, but to interpret what was thought to be t r a d i t i ~ n . ~  
In the modern period, we note three great changes. First, new 
nations, either undergoing or aiming at  industralization, do not 
merely codify traditional family norms. Instead, they develop 
new marriage and family laws, usually far in advance of public 
~ p i n i o n . ~  They can be found not only in the Communist countries, 
where you might take such radical transformations for granted, 
but also in Turkey, Japan, India, and the Arab countries. They 
have stated new sets of family obligations and rights, such as 
equal inheritance, freer mate choice, later age of marriage, new 
rights for women, freer divorce, and the like. These innovations 
occur long before anyone can claim that the transforming influ- 
ence of industralization could have had much effect. 
In the more fully industralized countries, a second large 
change is observable. Here one finds a greater concern for the 
lower-class family, and attempts to stabilize it, patch it up, or 
pick up the pieces. This concern first appeared in early 19th 
century England with the recognition that the factory system was 
undermining lower-class family life. However, it is safe to say 
that, on the whole, this concern did not lead to any substantial 
government action that aimed a t  stablizing lower-class family life 
until very recently, because instability, squalor, poor child- 
rearing practices, desertion, and child or wife abuse were viewed 
as normal, if deplorable, proletarian behavior. Proper, respect- 
able folk thought "that's the way those people live," and decent 
people should have little or no concern with them. Today, by 
contrast, we have come to feel-or at  least to assert publicly if we 
do not feel it sincerely-that all these poor people are our brothers 
1. By "state" or "government" I mean state in general, government in general; I do 
not intend any distinction between federal and state governments. 
2. When Henry VIII broke from the mother church in order to divorce and marry 
anew, that was a break with tradition, but note how odd and shocking it seemed to  his 
contemporaries. 
3. For elaborate data on this point see W. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION A D FAMILY 
PATTERNS (1963). 
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and sisters, and that we should help them, with or without their 
consent. 
A third change in the modern epoch should also be noted. 
Although moral leaders in every period of the past have deplored 
the state of family behavior, always charging that it has fallen 
away from the virtue of two generations earlier, this is surely the 
first period in which people suggest that the government should 
improve the family life of respectable classes. That is, we have 
come to believe that not only the lower classes but also the middle 
and upper classes exhibit failures in their family behavior and 
that, as a government, we should do something about it. 
Thus, many government programs have been inaugurated, 
and many others have been proposed, aimed at  improving family 
patterns. They include such things as day care centers, free abor- 
tion, new child custody rules, income tax provisions that define 
alimony as tax deductible and therefore primarily affect the mid- 
dle and upper-middle classes, funds for applied research in the 
area of family behavior, college classes (partially supported by 
state or federal funds) for marriage education, and so on. 
Having noted all this, I wish to express both profound skepti- 
cism about several aspects of these efforts and moderate approval 
of a few of them. First the skepticism: I do not believe that in fact 
any of the levels of government, federal, state, or local, have 
developed any family program at  all. The heads of some agencies 
have made speeches, and some people have expressed alarm or 
optimism, but no general program for improving family life has 
been offered or accepted. Most of the specific programs that have 
been discussed a t  this conference, such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security, day care, or in- 
come maintenance, have been aimed only in part a t  reforming or 
improving family life. Their provisions have been primarily fo- 
cused on trying to pick up the pieces and helping the poor, espe- 
cially the Black poor. This includes foster care, abortion clinics, 
and the like. They may have had some effect on the mainstream 
of family life, but only incidentally to their main goal of simply 
trying to clean up the wreckage created by our peculiar class and 
economic systems. 
Next, and contrary to many opinions expressed in these ses- 
sions, I do not believe that most of these government efforts have 
had much effect on family life. I do not think they have done 
much harm, but I do not think they have done much good, either. 
True enough, the AFDC rule that forbids welfare if there is a 
"man in the house" reduces family stability somewhat, but not 
by much. In fact, the rates of family dissolution were always very 
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high among such families. It is a common illusion, I think, that 
mothers in families qualifying for AFDC are mostly welfare 
cheats who are seduced by welfare into immoral lives and a rejec- 
tion of marital stability. The evidence runs all to the contrary. 
That is, most AFDC families do need the money; in fact, no male 
is available who could support them, and marital stability is 
simply not a real choice for such people. The continuing relaxa- 
tion of divorce laws certainly contributes to increased family dis- 
solution, but such laws have not aimed a t  restoring family stabil- 
ity or harmony; rather, they are reflective of deep social forces 
throughout our society that still press toward easier divorce. 
By contrast, my moderate approval is aroused by a few spe- 
cial programs where the government intervenes and the results 
are likely to be salutary. I would include here such steps as (1) 
the increasing efforts to locate and reduce child or wife abuse and 
n e g l e ~ t , ~  (2) the laws to facilitate the tracking down of ex- 
husbands and requiring them to pay child support, i. e. ,  to assume 
their family obligations, (3) the IRS provisions that permit a 
divorced working mother to deduct some costs of child care, (4) 
the police teams that have been organized in some cities for inter- 
vening in and stopping family fights without further violence 
(these have been relatively successful), ( 5 )  the government efforts 
to bring Blacks into the mainstream of American life-especially 
economic life-which will certainly reduce the Black illegitimacy 
rate,5 (6) the greater freedom of abortion, which cuts down the 
number of children who would otherwise be unwanted and some- 
what neglected, and (7) even the pamphlets, published by the 
millions, on child health and child-rearing. I think that at  a mini- 
mum they have educated a few parents to do somewhat less harm 
to their children. 
Although these are not small achievements, they cannot 
stem the general trend toward weakening family ties. Is there in 
4. For a summary discussion of this problem see Goode, Force and Violence,in the  
Family, 33 J .  MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 624 (1971). 
5. In 1967, I predicted that as a result of efforts to bring Blacks into the mainstream 
of American life, the illegitimacy rate would drop in the ensuing decade. That has hap- 
pened already with respect to the illegitimacy rate, i.e., the number of illegitimate births 
per 1000 married women; however, the illegitimacy ratio continues high. The latter figure 
is a ratio between the births in and out of wedlock, and if the birth rate drops (as it is 
doing) among married women while the number of births outside of marriage does not 
drop by the same amount, the ratio rises. This is a technical matter, but important; I 
think this ratio, too, will eventually drop. For analysis of this point see Goode, A Policy 
Paper for Illegitimacy, in ORGANIZING FOR COMMUNITY WELFARE 262 (M. Zald ed. 1967); 
Goode, Family Disorganization, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 390 (R. Merton & R. 
Nisbet eds. 1961). 
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fact anything that government could do? Here I am in accord 
with the position of my former colleague, Professor Caplow,"ut 
I would express it more broadly. The principle is that we can do 
many things to weaken or undermine the family, but we have 
little knowledge about the factors that strengthen it. This is an 
exemplification of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, of en- 
tropy. It is also a formulation of the famous McMurphy Law that 
if anything can go wrong, it will; or the statistical law, another 
version of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, that there are 
millions of ways to do things wrong, but very few of doing them 
right. 
Consider this principle as applied to the problem of child- 
rearing, that central responsibility of the family. In the social 
sciences, we now know much more than we did 50 years ago about 
which experiences hurt or destroy a child psychologically. But we 
really have only a gross, crude knowledge of how to transform a 
child into a mature, admirable, effective ~ i t i z e n . ~  We have made 
little progress toward defining those goals and still less toward 
agreeing among ourselves that we should actually seek them. But 
whatever they are, we still do not know how to achieve them. 
This is so, I think, for two large reasons. First, as a citizenry, 
we are unwilling to pay the price for what we say we really want. 
For example, people pay lip service to family stability. But for 
' themselves, they want something else, a bit more. They want 
more personal freedom, more self-seeking, more room for develop- 
ing their own interests and personalities, and less responsibility 
toward others. Most of us are not willing to accept the deep, real 
restrictions on choices that a strengthened family life would re- 
quire. 
Second, we have not invented, even in imagination, a new 
family pattern that does not simply aim impossibly a t  restoring 
the old traditional ways but instead creates an effective, stable 
family pattern that might work in our disorganized, industral- 
ized, urbanized, hedonistic society. Our thinking is hampered 
because a vital part of family history is irretrievably lost to us. 
Specifically, we have historical knowledge only of how families 
and social systems lose their ability to command group alle- 
6 .  See Caplow, The Loco Parent: Federal Policy and Family Life, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 
709. 
7. For data on socialization itself see Gecas, The Influence of Social Class on 
Socialization, in THEORIES ABOUT THE FAMILY (W. Burr, R. Hill, I. Reiss & F. Nye eds. 
forthcoming); D. BAUMRIND, EARLY SOCIALIZATION AND THE DISCIPLINE CONTROVERSY (1975) ; 
THE INTEGRATION F A CHILD INTO A SOCIAL WORLD (M. Richards ed. 1974); U. BRONFEN- 
BRENNEH, TWO WOHLDS OF CHILDHOOD (1970). These are excellent works, but they illustrate 
the difficulty of finding out how to improve parents' behavior. 
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giance, their ability to inspire sacrifice for others and for children, 
and their willingness to give up material, personal indulgences in 
favor of giving energies to the family. We have historical data on 
these processes of breakdown, but not on how those strong social 
patterns were ever built up? This trend of dissolution is what we 
have observed for a t  least the three centuries since the Protestant 
Reformation (or four, if you date from Martin Luther's nailing of 
his theses on the Wittenberg church door).. But we have been 
unable to learn how any society builds up or creates those tradi- 
tional social patterns. 
I believe sociologists and social philosophers would agree that 
a society governed well is likely to have a family system that 
functions well, but I assert that modern social science has little 
knowledge of how to effect a move in that direction. I doubt, 
therefore, that we shall change the course of this or any other 
great industrial society very soon, and possibly not a t  all. I am 
convinced, however, that if our society does achieve a moral re- 
generation, utterly unprecedented in history, we shall con- 
comitantly begin to make more pro-family decisions. 
Finally, although no society and no family system ever prom- 
ises continuing delight, or a rose garden, or happiness-and seek- 
ing happiness is surely one of the great illusions of our age-if we 
move toward a moral regeneration, if we change the major direc- 
tions in which our society moves, we shall do so only by accepting 
the greater restrictions on personal choices and heavier demands 
for personal sacrifice that stable family life requires. If we do that, 
I predict that as a people we shall enjoy far more quiet content- 
ment and pleasure than a t  present, when personal happiness is 
much more immediate goal of most American families. 
8. For an analysis of why many important historical data are missing in our family 
inquiries, especially the periods in which large, tightly knit kinship systems were built up 
see Goode, The Theory and Measurement of Family Change, in INDICATORS OF SOCIAL 
CHANGE 295 (W. Morre & E. Sheldon eds. 1968). 
